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Introduction
The relationship between design and the world of production has 
always fluctuated between two main views: the reductionist view 
of design—as one of the skills required in the product develop-
ment process to enhance the appeal of the products; and the 
cultural view of design—as that unique system of competencies, 
knowledge, and skills, that (including the artifacts, practices, 
values, and beliefs that belong to the design culture) can envision 
innovative solutions that meet explicit or latent needs encompass-
ing different constraints.
 Even when the second perspective is assumed, the introduc-
tion of design culture within companies normally meets many 
obstacles—primarily the established culture and the natural resis-
tance to change of organizations in which design culture seems to 
fight a daily war by being indissolubly bound to innovation.
 That established organizations naturally develop a resis-
tance to change is widely recognized,1 and Treacy noticed that 
innovation, with the uncertainty that it brings and the alteration 
of the condition of efficiency linked to repetition,2 can be described 
as a “last chance” that companies are forced to face in moments 
of trouble.
 At the same time, we must also recognize that a prevailing 
line of thought on innovation underlines how companies must 
develop a sort of resilience—a capacity to “continuously anticipate 
and adjust to changes that threaten their core earning power, and 
change before the need becomes desperately obvious.”3 This line of 
thought nevertheless recognizes the difficulty of doing so.
 As a function mainly involved in the development of 
new products, design challenges the natural organizational 
attitudes of preservation and resistance to change, generating 
a constant tension between the search for innovation and the 
necessity of relying on established ideas and solutions. In our 
opinion, this constant tension builds a significant link between 
design practice and culture and the problem of managing organi-
zational change. Although change management can be described 
as a prescriptive and top-down practice, in which organizational 
1 Karl E. Weick, Sensemaking in  
Organizations (London: Sage, 1995); 
Edgar H. Schein, The Corporate  
Culture Survival Guide (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass, 1999); Gareth R. Jones, 
Organizational Theory, Design, and 
Change, 5th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007).
2 Michael Treacy; “Innovation as a Last 
Resort,” Harvard Business Review 82,  
no. 7/8 (2004): 29–31.
3 Gary Hamel and Liisa Välikangas; “The 
Quest for Resilience,” Harvard Business 
Review 81, no. 9 (2003): 52–63.
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models and their sets of techniques and tools are normally 
abstracted from a context, operationalized, and transferred and 
applied to other contexts, we think that design practice and culture 
introduce a  bottom-up perspective to organizational change that 
usually takes place in unexpected ways during the development 
of new products within companies.
 How do design practice and culture relate to organizational 
change or even stimulate it?
 The development of significant innovative products,4 ser-
vices and solutions implies relevant changes in all the elements 
that compose the culture of an enterprise:5 processes, core compe-
tencies, knowledge, technologies, behaviors, values, and dogmas.6 
As a consequence, the bottom-up perspective that is presented in 
this paper assumes that designing significantly new products 
might bring unexpected changes in the culture of an enterprise 
because contradictions might arise between the current culture 
and the one needed to implement the innovations. Thus, when 
design culture interacts with the culture of an enterprise, as can 
happen in the process of developing of a new product, the culture 
of the enterprise might change as an unexpected consequence of 
the interaction between the two types of culture. A significantly 
new product requires the implementation of a series of organiza-
tional changes that leads ultimately to changes in the enterprise 
culture. Conversely, if any culture externalizes and represents 
itself in the artifacts that it produces, then its products are expres-
sions of the culture of the enterprise that produces them. Examin-
ing the products of an enterprise can provide an understanding of 
the culture that underpins them.
 The adoption of a bottom-up perspective on organizational 
change is linked not just to the observation of real cases but also to 
the recognized situatedness of design practice and culture as a 
possible value; this perspective sits in opposition to the idea of 
models and techniques that can supposedly be applied indiffer-
ently in any context and situation.7 On the basis of this opposition, 
we not only generically criticize top-down change management 
approaches but also specifically demystify design thinking as a 
method and a set of connected tools that could lead managers to 
embrace the need for change and innovation.
 The paper is structured as follows: First, we briefly introduce 
the main currents of thought in organizational change studies, fur-
ther developing the connection between new product development 
and the need for change in the culture of the enterprise because of 
contradictions between the existing culture of the enterprise and 
the one needed to develop and exploit new products. Second, we 
examine how managerial practice is generally characterized by a 
type of reductionist thinking, in which methods, techniques, and 
tools are extracted from their original context and adopted along 
4 Enter into the debate on radical vs. incre-
mental innovation is not the aim of this 
study; thus, we introduce the idea of 
“significant innovation” in a relative way 
by connecting it to a specific context or 
enterprise. Note that something does not 
have to be significantly new to represent 
a radical innovation for the enterprise, as 
is the case for Sony Playstation and many 
other successful products.
5 “Enterprise” basically refers to a newly 
established organization that aims to 
generate an innovation to be exchanged 
on the market. This term is currently used 
similarly to “company,” and the two are 
often used interchangeably, even if a 
company is a formal and well-established 
business organization that seeks profit by 
exchanging value in the market. Enter-
prises and companies are specific forms 
of organizations that aim to develop and 
maintain private business. Because the 
differences are not significant for the 
purposes of this paper, the two terms  
are adopted as synonyms. However, 
“organization” is a different matter. An 
organization is considered to be  any 
human association that pursues a 
common goal, and the term is therefore 
more general. While an enterprise is an 
organization, an organization is not 
necessarily an enterprise. In the paper, 
the term will be adopted to discuss  
theories and tools to study and manage 
organizational change.
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TU Delft, 2011), 1-12. 
7 Donald A. Schon, The Reflective Practi-
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(London: Temple Smith, 1983); John S. 
Gero, “Towards a Model of Designing 
Which Includes Its Situatedness,” in 
Universal Design Theory, H. Grabowski, 
S. Rude, and G. Grein, eds. (Aachen, 
Germany: Shaker Verlag, 1998), 47–56.
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increasingly shorter lifecycles to manage organizational change. 
Such practice occurs even when the theories on organizational 
change are holistic and systematic. Next, we differentiate the 
notion of design culture from design thinking and discuss it in 
relation to enterprise culture. In this part, we express the idea that 
the products of an enterprise are not just the synthesis of the end 
user’s needs, but essentially are the synthesis of its culture. From 
this assumption, we hypothesize that the development of new 
products often generates or requires changes in the culture of the 
enterprise as a kind of “side effect” related to the novelty of the 
products (at least for this particular enterprise). To verify this 
hypothesis, we consider three cases: the Sony Playstation, the 
LEGO Mindstorm, and the strategic design division in 3M. The 
cases are discussed in the last part of the article, in which evidence 
in favor of design culture as an implicit agent of change is pro-
vided alongside some lessons learned from the study.
Design and Organizational Change
Research on organizational management and social studies has 
a long tradition of binding the competitiveness of an enterprise to 
its capability to continuously change its culture by overcoming 
organizational dogmas and by pursuing innovation.8
 Many authors have provided definitions of organizational 
change. Moran and Brightman describe it as “the process of con-
tinually renewing an organization’s direction, structure, and 
capabilities to serve the ever-changing needs of external and inter-
nal customers.”9 Burnes noted that organizational change refers to 
understanding alterations in organizations at the broadest level 
among individuals and groups, and, at the collective level, across 
the entire organization.10 Regardless of the definition used, any 
significant change in an enterprise is seen as related to a shift in its 
culture: Organizational changes are symptoms of a change in the 
organization’s culture.
 Literature on organizational change differs in format and 
tone and encompasses several perspectives: descriptive accounts of 
change; theoretical models for analyzing change; prescriptive 
models that aim to guide the change process; typologies of differ-
ent approaches to organizational change; and empirical studies of 
the success and failure of various initiatives, programs, and tools. 
For the sake of brevity, we cluster these contributions and distin-
guish between the main schools of thought.
 The first set of studies considers change to be something 
emergent rather than planned.11 According to this school of 
thought, managers make a number of decisions that are apparently 
unrelated to the change that emerges, and the change is therefore 
not planned. However, these decisions may be based on unspoken, 
perhaps unconscious assumptions about the organization, its envi-
ronment, and its future and are therefore not as unrelated as they 
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initially seem. Such implicit assumptions would dictate the direc-
tion of the unrelated decisions, thereby shaping the change pro-
cess by serendipity and intuition rather than by planning. External 
factors (e.g., the economy, competitors’ behavior, the political cli-
mate) or internal features (e.g., the relative power of different inter-
est groups, the distribution of knowledge, uncertainty) influence 
the change in directions outside of managerial control. Even the 
most carefully planned and executed change program has some 
emergent effects and qualities. This reality highlights two impor-
tant aspects of managing change: (1) the need to identify, explore, 
and, if necessary, challenge the assumptions that underlie manage-
rial decisions, and (2) the possibility of facilitating (rather than pre-
cisely controlling) organizational change on the basis of perceptive 
and insightful analysis and planning, and of well-crafted, sensitive 
implementation phases. The reasoning is that organization-level 
change is not fixed or linear in nature but contains different emer-
gent elements.12
 A second set of studies distinguishes between episodic and 
continuous change. Episodic change is infrequent and not 
planned.13 Sometimes called “radical” or “second-order” change, 
episodic change often involves the replacement of one strategy or 
program with another. Continuous change, in contrast, is evolu-
tionary and cumulative and is defined as “first-order” or “incre-
mental” change.14 The distinction between episodic and continuous 
change helps clarify thinking about the future development and 
evolution of an organization relative to its long-term goals. Few 
organizations are in a position to unilaterally decide that they will 
adopt an exclusively continuous change approach. However, they 
can capitalize on many of the principles of continuous change by 
engendering the flexibility to accommodate and experiment with 
everyday contingencies, breakdowns, exceptions, opportunities, 
and unintended consequences that punctuate organizational life.15
 A third set of studies addresses change relative to its extent 
and scope. Ackerman describes three types of change: develop-
mental, transitional, and transformational.16 Developmental change 
enhances or corrects existing aspects of an organization, often 
focusing on the improvement of a skill, a process, or a procedure. 
Transitional change seeks to achieve a known desired state that is 
different from the existing one. The model of transitional change 
has its foundation in the work of Lewin,17 although Schein has 
more recently defined the theory conceptualizing change as a 
three-stage process that involves: (1) unfreezing the existing orga-
nizational equilibrium, (2) moving to a new position, and (3) 
refreezing in a new equilibrium position.18 Transformational 
change requires a shift in the assumptions made by the organiza-
tion and its members, participants, or employees. Transformation 
can result in an organization that differs significantly in terms of 
12 Sandra Dawson, Analysing Organisations 
(London: Macmillan, 1996). 
13 Karl E. Weick and R. E. Quinn, “Organiza-
tional Change and Development,” Annual 
Review of Psychology 50 (1999): 361–86.
14 Weick and Quinn, “Organizational 
Change and Development,” 361-86.
15 Wanda Orlikowski, “Improvising Organi-
zational Transformation over Time: A 
Situated Change Perspective,” Informa-
tion Systems Research 7, no. 1 (1996): 
63–92.
16 Linda Ackerman, “Development, Transi-
tion or Transformation: The Question of 
Change in Organizations,” in Organization 
Development Classics, Donald Van 
Eynde, Judith Hoy, and Dixie Van Eynde, 
eds. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997).
17 Kurt Lewin, Field Theory in Social 
Science (New York: Harper Row,1951).
18 Edgar H. Schein, Process Consultation 
(Wokingham: Addison-Wesley, 1987).
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structure, processes, culture, and strategy. It might therefore result 
in the creation of an organization that operates in developmental 
mode, or one that continuously learns, adapts, and improves.
 Change can be understood relative to the complex dynamic 
systems within which it takes place. Contrary to the scientific 
method (summarized by Karl Popper in 1972 as the three Rs: 
reduction, repeatability, and refutation), systems thinking explores 
the properties that exist once the parts have been combined into 
a whole. Applied to organizational change, systems thinking 
suggests that issues, events, forces, and incidents should not 
be viewed as isolated phenomena but as interconnected and inter-
dependent components of a complex, socio-technical system. 
Accordingly, change is chaotic and often involves shifting goals, 
discontinuous activities, surprising events, and unexpected com-
binations of changes and outcomes.19
 Even if the literature on organizational change is rich and 
heterogeneous, only a few contributions have discussed the idea 
that design culture and practice can be a vehicle, an agent of 
change in the culture of an enterprise. In design literature, which 
has recently devoted much time to its relationship with manage-
ment, we also see little on this topic, unless we read between the 
lines and suggest further interpretations of contributions focused 
on other aspects.20 As a major contribution, our study is inspired 
by a special issue of this journal, edited by Richard Buchanan, that 
specifically focused on design and organizational change.21 
This work introduces new points of view on the relationship 
between design and management, arguing for “a new kind of 
design research, oriented directly toward the influence of design 
on organizational life.”22 It also reports on a few interesting case 
studies that focus on the process of developing new products and 
on the way these processes and products interact with the organi-
zation and culture of an enterprise. In particular, Junginger’s 
contribution, “Product Development as a Vehicle for Organiza-
tional Change,” investigates the possibility that product develop-
ment might lead to organizational change in an enterprise when 
it is bound to the idea that the process of product development 
should be “human-centered,” or when the needs and the points 
of view of external actors, such as customers and suppliers, are 
brought into the organization and thus provoke “outside-in” 
change, as opposed to the normal “inside-out” view of the organi-
zation as a machine.
 In this paper, we begin from Buchanan’s insights and pro-
pose a shift in the unit of analysis of the relationship between 
design and organizational transformations. In particular, while 
Buchanan’s contribution focuses on the idea that organizations can 
be seen as products and can therefore be considered “objects of 
design,” our idea is that design culture and practice, when situated 
19 Dawson, Analysing Organisations.
20 Peter Coughlan, Suri Jane Fulton, and 
Katherine Canales, “Prototypes as 
(Design) Tools for Behavioral and  
Organizational Change,” The Journal  
of Applied Behavioral Science 43,  
no. 1 (2007): 1–13; Colin Bruns et al., 
Transformation Design, Red Paper 02 
(London: Design Council, 2006).
21 Richard Buchanan, ed., “Design and 
Organizational Change” Design Issues 
24, no. 1 (2008): 2 -107.
22 Richard Buchanan, “Introduction,”  
Ibid., 3.
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23 Donny Miller and Jon Hartwick,  
“Spotting Management Fads,” Harvard 
Business Review 80, no. 10 (2002): 26–7; 
David Collins, “The Branding of Manage-
ment Knowledge: Rethinking Manage-
ment Fads,” Journal of Organizational 
Change Management 16, no. 2 (2003): 
186–204.
within the culture of an enterprise and applied to achieve signifi-
cant innovation in products and services, can lead to organiza-
tional change.
 In developing our thesis, we would also like to step away 
from the idea of design thinking as it took shape in the discourse 
on the relationship between design and management. Although 
few years ago we could still use the term “design thinking” from a 
positive perspective by thinking about it as one of the ways to inte-
grate design into managerial culture, today we think that its use is, 
in many cases, misleading, as we explain further.
 Finally, even if we do not want to neglect or contradict the 
open and expanding nature of the design discipline, which seems 
to be constantly conquering new territories, we must underline a 
specific risk in continuously linking design to new potential areas 
of application by saying that they might be seen as “objects of 
design.” We observe that management has already undertaken a 
similar practice: Because the perspective is that almost all human 
activities or products can or must be managed, everything is seen 
as a possible object of managerial studies.
 By assuming all of these critical points, our unit of analysis 
is much more focused on the “traditional” product development 
practice while seeking to investigate forms of “bottom-up” organi-
zational change that take place during and throughout the process 
of product development, which ultimately brought us to the idea of 
design as an implicit agent of change.
 Although theories of organizational change recognize the 
complexity of the phenomenon of change in organizations and 
therefore display a systematic and holistic attitude, organizational 
management is characterized by a wide number of models and 
techniques that seem to be derived from a reductionist way of 
thinking, thereby producing formulas that can be easily synthe-
sized and turned into slogans, procedures and recipes that can be 
applied to a variety of situations with minimal adaptation. Despite 
harsh criticism of the fast turnover of these managerial models and 
techniques that led to the description of many of them as fads, the 
practice still seems to prosper.23 
 From a certain point of view, design thinking can be seen as 
one of these fads: It could be associated with the growth of large 
design consultancies, just as many managerial models and tech-
niques are bound to the growth of large managerial consultancies. 
Although it was initially meant to introduce research on design 
and new product development processes, it was subsequently 
turned into a managerial approach through the process of abstrac-
tion from its original context. 
 The three main faults of design thinking as it was extended 
to the management realm were: (1) the lack of contextualization 
and situatedness—a typical characteristic of new, quickly adopted-
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and-dismissed managerial models; (2) the separation of the 
ideation and the development processes; and (3) the idea of a top-
down practice that principally affects the management rather than 
the whole enterprise. To become effective in enterprises, design 
must become part of the culture, and companies must develop 
their unique design culture by integrating design through bottom-
up processes that require negotiation and alignment and are con-
tinually performed in the never-ending activity of innovation.
 We next introduce the notion of design culture as the sys-
tem of knowledge, competences, and skills that operates in a situ-
ated context that designers adopt to develop new solutions, in 
relation and opposition to the notion of design thinking as a 
context-independent process. We seek to demonstrate that design 
culture can often provoke changes in the whole culture of an 
enterprise (in an implicit way) during the process of development 
of new products. The following paragraphs argue this hypothesis 
by discussing three cases of cultural change in enterprises as an 
unexpected consequence of innovation projects and by drawing 
some theoretical conclusions.
A Different Perspective: Design as an Implicit Agent of  
Organizational Change 
The analysis of design from the perspective of organizational 
change throws new light on the relationship between design 
culture and enterprise culture: Design challenges the natural orga-
nizational attitudes of preservation and resistance to change, gen-
erating a constant tension between the search for innovation and 
the necessity of relying on established ideas and solutions. This 
constant tension builds a significant link between design practice 
and culture and the problem of managing organizational change.
 The hypothesis that we discuss is that every project leading 
to a significant innovation can trigger, like a domino effect, 
changes at different levels of the culture of an enterprise as a con-
sequence of the contradictions that it generates within the enter-
prise. We define these contradictions as tensions between the 
degree of change in the culture of an enterprise required to 
develop a new product (trigger for change), and the current culture 
of the enterprise (constraint to change). Contradictions are the 
sources of change in all situations in which innovation overcomes 
the constraints to its own development by generating new arti-
facts, knowledge, beliefs, processes, structures and technologies 
that become part of the culture of the enterprise by modifying it.
Design and Culture: The Dialectic Between the Context of Destination 
and the Original Context of New Products
The discourse on the relation between design and culture is usu-
ally based on the idea that we should link design to the cultural 
context in which it occurs/operates to better understand or guide 
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it. The cultural context is then interpreted as a recipient for the 
design of products, which will be better conceived (if we look at 
the process from a professional perspective) or better understood 
(if we look at the process from a historical perspective) by linking 
them with the cultural context. Therefore, culture is a reference to 
the end-user at an individual or at a social level: The design of the 
product can be interpreted as the result of the context of its desti-
nation in its multifaceted dimensions, including the cultural one.
 Some scholars introduced the idea of “culture-oriented 
product design,” or the idea that culture can be seen as a catalyst 
for designing innovative products if and when designers are able 
to incorporate a specific culture into the product design, thereby 
giving space to the interpretation of local characteristics, in con-
trast to the globalization of solutions.24 This line of thinking can be 
associated with the vast literature on the reasons and modes of 
making design interact with the context of destination, primarily 
but not only represented by the end-user, thus leading to solutions 
that properly fit a specific context.25 If we assume that designers 
should focus not just on the needs but also on the culture of the 
end-user, we get to the idea of “culture-oriented product design.”
 Although we do not want to neglect the importance of the 
cultural context of destination, we note a gap in that a product can 
be interpreted not just as the result of its context of destination, but 
also and in some cases, primarily as the result of its original con-
text. In this case, a new product must also be seen as the result of 
the culture of the company that produced it. If we look at the con-
text of destination as the main force that influences the design pro-
cess, then we are primarily driven to consider the culture of the 
end-user; but if we look at the original context as the main force 
that influences the design process, then we are primarily driven to 
consider the culture of the company, or else “the way things get 
done around here,” which is one of the most famous definitions of 
corporate culture.
 Many cases illustrate how entrepreneurial ideas can be 
bound to specific contexts and how single products are necessarily 
consequences of the environment in which they are born. We 
might explain the adoption of closed software solutions in Apple 
as an intentional choice bound to the company’s culture; or we 
might describe the whole philosophy and offering of the Italian 
company Technogym, market leader in the fitness and biomedical 
rehabilitation equipment field, as bound to the culture of the geo-
graphical area where it is located—one of the most important lei-
sure districts in Europe.
Design Culture as a Process
If we look at products as material evidence or results of the culture 
of an enterprise, we must at the same time observe that new prod-
ucts produce a shift in this culture, or else that the cause–effect 
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Figure 1 
The picture shows the role of design culture 
as a complex process of mediation between 
the world of production and that of consump-
tion, performed during innovation projects. 
Design culture, as a situated feature, assumes 
different characters depending on the specific 
culture of the enterprise that, by starting a 
specific innovation project, aims to satisfy 
the needs of a specific consumption culture. 
Projects of innovation are led by the capability 
of design culture to situate its action through 
the activation of a process of trial and error, 
leading to the development of solutions that 
can encompass resistance and constraints 
posed by the culture of the enterprise to meet 
needs and expectation posed by the world  
of consumption.
connection can be easily inverted. This view suggests that imple-
menting successful and lasting innovation requires strong organi-
zational changes and a shift in the design culture, and that the 
introduction of a (new) design culture in an enterprise often 
should be coupled with organizational change management. In 
opposition to the idea that design thinking is independent from 
design practice, we see design culture as a specific system of 
knowledge, competences, and skills that operates in a specific 
context to develop new products and services; that mediates 
between the world of production and consumption; and that coor-
dinates multiple factors related to technology, market, and society 
(see Figure 1). Design culture encompasses the actual practice of 
designers rather than reflecting only the formalization and learn-
ing of non-situated formulas for innovation. Design culture 
includes those competences and knowledges (the sets of distinctive 
knowledge, processes, and tools) used for solving complex prob-
lems and for “conceiving and planning what does not yet exist.”26 
Design culture can be generated and acquired by enterprises as 
they develop artifacts and attribute meaning to them in the social 
contexts where they operate and meet their customers.
 Julier’s contribution emphasizes the interpretation of design 
culture as a process which:
 is, perhaps, the most established usage, and stems from  
 architectural and design criticism. In particular, it  
 describes the immediate contextual influences and  
 contextually informed actions within the development  
 of a design. A close term that throws light on this is the  
 Italian…“cultura di progetto.” The word “progetto” implies  
 something broader than simply the form-giving within  
 design, but extends to the totality of carrying out design;  
 for example, from conceiving and negotiating artifacts with  
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 clients, to studio organization, to the output of the design  
 and to its realization. Within all these… is an implied  
 interest in the systems of negotiation—often verbal—that  
 conspire to define and frame design artifacts. […..] Thus,  
 the project process is understood to be produced within  
 and by a network of everyday knowledge and practices  
 that surround the designer.27
The notion of design culture emphasizes a “way of doing things” 
in a context-dependent manner.28 It involves the origination of 
new products and product forms but also their value augmenta-
tion, or “the structuring of a systematic approach to understanding 
the dynamics and effects of material and immaterial relationships 
that are articulated by and through the multiple [artifacts] of 
design culture.”29
 From this perspective of design culture, innovation in an 
enterprise might affect its established structure and culture and 
might challenge the way in which people interact, the existing 
capabilities, and how things are accomplished in daily activities. 
Note that, to understand both the reasons behind the development 
of new products and the concept of design culture, we must con-
sider both an “outside-in” perspective (i.e., products as a result of 
quests from different external stakeholders, primarily customers) 
and an “inside-out” perspective (i.e., products as results of the 
company’s culture). In new product development literature, we 
note a general overestimation of the second perspective, while in 
many situations, the first seems to prevail; we should, in any case, 
apply an integrated vision.
 In the following paragraphs, we introduce three cases: The 
first two describe processes of new product development; the third 
describes the process of acquiring and diffusing design culture in 
a science and engineering-based enterprise through the develop-
ment of new products. The three cases are examples of how design 
culture and practice, in interaction with the established culture of 
an enterprise, can change the culture in different ways. These 
cases illustrate the vision of design culture as having the capability 
to perform a complex and dynamic process of mediation also 
influenced by the technological developments, the socio-economic 
constraints of the manufacturing process, and the cultural context 
that gives rise to the need for new products, the effect of which 
may result in the change of the culture of the company.
The LEGO Mindstorm Case
The Danish toy company, LEGO Group, provides an interesting 
example of how the development of a new product (the LEGO 
Mindstorm) can reshape the culture of the enterprise and reinforce 
its competitive strategies and market position. Since 2009, LEGO 
27 Guy Julier, “From Visual Culture to 
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no. 1 (2006): 70.
28 Buchanan and Margolin, Discovering 
Design; Silvia Pizzocaro, “Research, 
Theory, and Design Culture: A Knowledge 
Growing Within Complexity,” in Proceed-
ings of the Politecnico Di Milano Confer-
ence, Silvia Pizzocaro, Amilton Arruda, 
and Dijon De Moraes, eds. (Milano: 
Design Plus Research, 2000), 90-95; 
Flaviano Celaschi, Il Design della Forma 
Merce [The design of the Form Goods] 
(Milano: Ilsole24ore, 2000); Paola Bertola 
and Carlos Teixeira, “Design as a Knowl-
edge Agent: How Design as a Knowledge 
Process Is Embedded into Organizations 
to Foster Innovation,” Design Studies 24, 
no. 2 (2003): 181–94; and Flaviano Celas-
chi, and Alessandro Deserti, Design e 
Innovazione: Strumenti e Pratiche per la 
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Research] (Roma: Carocci, 2007).
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products have continued their global success, resulting in a 
significant increase in global sales. LEGO’s growth was realized 
in a stagnant global toy market. The highest growth rates occurred 
in English-speaking markets, but almost all markets achieved dou-
ble-digit growth rates. However, results have not always been so 
flattering for LEGO Company management. In recent years, the 
emerging videogame market has been a constant and real menace 
to its existence. 
 Like many organizations, LEGO built its business model on 
intellectual property. Thus, the process of product innovation was 
managed internally: LEGO conducted market research to under-
stand what customers thought about its products, developed new 
products based on the derived information, and created marketing 
communication campaigns to build the brand around customer 
expectations. However, as computer games grew in popularity, the 
company feverishly tried to adapt to new trends and opportunities 
in the marketplace. LEGO ultimately decided to enter this market 
with the development of LEGO Mindstorm. The product basically 
used robotics along with LEGO bricks and supports, but the core 
of the product was its software. 
 By using the LEGO Mindstorm software, customers should 
have been able to program their own robot of bricks. But when the 
product entered the market it did not have the expected success 
because the programmable functionalities were limited, and the 
kids wanted something more. At that time, LEGO was a company 
with significant expertise in brick toys but with virtually no 
knowledge about electronic games and their potential users.
 Within two weeks after the product’s launch in 1998, adult 
hackers reverse-engineered the firmware and developed a number 
of additional software programs that could be used to program the 
robots, and a small market of sensors and peripherals that could be 
added to these robots also emerged.
 The Mindstorm line was LEGO’s attempt to achieve sub-
stantial revenue growth by broadening its customer base to 
include older children and adults. Although LEGO’s initial attempt 
was a market failure, it ultimately found a new strategy for attract-
ing older age groups into its market base. What resulted from the 
development of LEGO Mindstorm was that LEGO learned it did 
not need to add bells and whistles to LEGO bricks but just needed 
to exploit the literacy of the customers by involving them in the 
process, so that they could be engaged in play that is sophisticated, 
constructive, and fun.
 The search for innovative and new functionalities of Mind-
storm, achieved by hacking the original software, demonstrated to 
the company the potential of crowd-sourcing as an innovation 
tool. The potential of the product skyrocketed with this “open soft-
ware” approach, and it generated dramatic engagement among 
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customers along all of the LEGO product lines. The company real-
ized that the many customers who were using and adapting—and 
in some cases violating, as with Mindstorm—the LEGO Group’s 
intellectual property were not threatening the culture, core compe-
tences, and intellectual assets of the company; instead, they were 
actually redefining them and thus introducing the company to 
new, intriguing, and innovative territories.
 Accepting this new relationship with the customer base 
meant that LEGO needed to change its philosophy and approach to 
innovation processes, moving from a model in which innovation is 
created by internal functions (e.g., R&D and Marketing) to a model 
of open innovation strongly based on interactions with a commu-
nity of hackers, developers, and designers who were literate in 
LEGO products and technically competent. This community gave 
LEGO the opportunity to develop important concepts, such as Lego 
Technic30—a line of products built together with customers who 
were Lego-literate enough to design complex models on their own.
 By opening itself up to an active involvement with these 
enthusiasts, the company was able to tap into a rich vein of inno-
vative thinking and was able, once again, to make the brand 
relevant.31 Although the development of the original Mindstorm 
product went badly, the case perfectly shows the potential effect of 
a new product development process on the culture of a company: 
In this case, a dramatic shift occurred, from the traditional protec-
tion of copyright and intellectual property toward open innovation 
and co-creation practices.
 The value of co-creation at LEGO cannot be related to the 
traditional concept of customization. Instead, it has much more to 
do with a series of changes at the company: in the mentality and 
mind set of its management from a product-centered to a cus-
tomer-centered vision; in the core competences of its R&D from 
closed and internal teams to peer-to-peer teams (customers and 
people from LEGO); and in the products portfolio from a set of 
bricks of different sizes and colors to a line of products designed as 
thematic collections (e.g., Technic, City, LEGO Factory, LEGO 
Farm, LEGO Harry Potter, and LEGO Creator).
The Sony Playstation Case
Sony’s capability to make advanced technological products charac-
terized it throughout its history, from the first small transistor 
radio to the Walkman, and from the CD player to digital cameras. 
Despite this strong capability, Sony faced a dramatic crisis in the 
1990s that brought the company to the brink of economic disaster.32 
Profits fell from $1.3 billion in 1993 to a loss of $3.3 billion in 1995. 
The investment in Hollywood resulted in a huge failure, with a 
single loss of $3 billion in 1995. Even more worrying was that, in 
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consumer electronics: PCs, mobile phones, and video games. The 
PC market at the time was split between large players (HP, Com-
paq, Dell, Toshiba) and small producers (including Apple), all of 
which defeated Sony. Nokia, Motorola, and Ericsson dominated 
the mobile phone market, while video games were in the hands of 
Sega and Nintendo. 
 All of these new markets were based on digital technologies. 
Meanwhile, Sony’s success had always been based on analogic 
technologies, such as VCRs and televisions. With the exception of a 
few scattered designers in the company, very few employees were 
acquainted with these new technologies, which were revolution-
izing the consumer electronics market. One of the few designers 
conscious of this radical change was Ken Kutaragi, who worked at 
that time in the Sony R&D lab and was on the research team that 
developed the “Mavica,” the first digital camera.
 Without a formal mandate, Kutaragi began work on a new 
electronic product in the late 1980s that would eventually lead to 
the creation of the Computer Entertainment Division in 1993 and 
to the launch of the PlayStation in 1994. After less than five years, 
PlayStation represented 12% of the whole revenue of Sony ($57 
billion), and the company became a leader in the electronic enter-
tainment market.
 The project to develop the new device started when Nin-
tendo launched its 8-bit product for video games, the GameBoy. 
Kuratagi decided to develop a 16-bit device that would improve 
the horrible sound of the Gameboy and that would make game 
storage easier, avoiding magnetic tapes by exploiting the CD player 
technology that Sony had already mastered. The project began 
because of Kuratagi’s “curiosity” for videogames (he had bought 
a GameBoy for his daughter but was very disappointed with 
its performance) and because of the expertise of the employees 
who had participated in the Mavica project. When the design team 
informed top management about this new 16-bit system, manage-
ment would not support its development because it was perceived 
as inconsistent with the existing activities and interests of the 
company. The decision revealed management’s perception that 
the videogame market was somehow “frivolous” and that it did 
not match Sony’s image, which was based on sophisticated techno-
logical products. Company culture was centered solely on produc-
ing small and reliable products based on tough core competences 
in analogical technologies. Despite the rejection, some senior 
managers were struck by the project and by the design team’s 
approach, which they saw as offering new possibilities. In 1986, 
these senior managers arranged a meeting to discuss the project 
with the designers. The group and its leader, Kuratagi, strongly 
believed that after the crisis of the preceding years and the failure 
of a series of “traditional” products, Sony should enter the digital 
entertainment market and develop a new “digital” culture. The 
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process had already begun, although in an unstructured way: 
Sony was selling millions of CD players and other products, 
including new digital components, without having developed a 
vision for the digital market and its role in the competitive arena. 
To Sony, for example, the CD was considered a replacement of the 
vinyl record, rather than a product of the digital revolution.
 The vision of the design team inspired one senior manager 
who decided to support the project as a personal venture, but its 
development was kept a secret from the rest of the company. The 
failure of the MSX project (the home computer architecture that 
never became the expected international standard), the lack of con-
sistent internal expertise in consumer electronics, and a lack of 
visionary leadership prevented the company from initiating real 
organizational change to address the potential new market.
 In this context, the new 16-bit system developed by Kuratagi 
still could not become a Sony product, but it served as a bridge-
head to the world of digital entertainment. Lacking experience in 
the sector, the senior manager decided to allow Kuratagi to estab-
lish a research collaboration with Nintendo to develop a new chip 
that would better handle the audio of the GameBoy. However, the 
design and development of this new chip remained secret because 
it would have generated internal conflicts. Most of management 
would not understand why the R&D division was helping a com-
petitor develop a better solution for its products.
 In 1991, Nintendo renegotiated the agreement with Sony: 
The company was concerned that the CD player technology, on 
which Sony was continuously working, would weaken its domi-
nant position in the videogames market. In fact, the CD technology 
had huge potential as a support for videogames, but it conflicted 
with magnetic cassettes, which were then the standard.
 Development of the new chip almost came to a halt; but 
something had changed in the vision of the management, and the 
design team was able to convince senior management that the 
chip’s design, as a new platform, would give Sony the chance to 
successfully enter the digital entertainment market. The company 
began to see the potential of this new product. The work carried on 
by the design team realigned the company’s vision in a completely 
innovative and effective way. A series of events—Nintendo’s fear 
of losing its strong market position, the failure of the deal with 
Nintendo, and the pride and vision underlying the Sony designers 
working on the project—gave way to the birth of the Sony Com-
puter Entertainment Division. After two years of work, the Sony 
Playstation was introduced. The transistor under its plastic shield 
was one of the first to incorporate a 32-bit processor, a graphics 
chip, and a data decompression system on a single piece of sili-
con—the “system-on-a-chip.” The PlayStation was launched in 
Japan in December 1994. Nintendo’s launch of a similar product, 
the Nintendo 64, came a full 18 months later, delay was critical: 
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Sony gained supremacy in a key market. Exponentially growing 
sales reflected the value of the Sony brand and its technical superi-
ority. The PlayStation quickly became the best-selling console, and 
in subsequent years, Sony went through a series of organizational 
and market changes that turned it into one of the world’s leading 
companies in consumer electronics.33
The 3M Global Strategic Design Case
In 2011, 3M generated more than $29 billion in annual revenue and 
managed an extensive portfolio of more than 55,000 products.34 
With more than 40,000 global patents and patent applications, the 
company had mastered the traditional R&D process, becoming 
renowned for the 15% rule—the time given to its researchers to 
work on their own personal interests and introduced by William 
McKnight in 1948. The strategy has much more recently been 
adopted by companies such as Google.35
 But from 2001 to 2005, 3M faced significant financial trou-
bles. Attention turned from innovation to applying the Six Sigma 
management strategy, imported by James McNerney from GE and 
based on the idea of improving the quality of process outputs by 
identifying and removing the causes of defects and minimizing 
variability in manufacturing and business processes. The compa-
ny’s efficiency increased as it focused on execution, but mean-
while, the core character of the company—innovation—registered 
a lower performance. In 2006, the typical one-third of sales repre-
sented by products introduced in the past five years dropped to 
one-quarter: “The impact of the Six Sigma regime… was that more 
predictable, incremental work took precedence over blue-sky 
research.”36
 The need for change and for the return to a focus on innova-
tion was strong and clear: “[T]he onus shifts to growth and innova-
tion, especially in today’s idea-based, design-obsessed economy. 
While process excellence demands precision, consistency, and rep-
etition, innovation calls for variation, failure, and serendipity.”37 
Design was introduced in 3M in the following years as a new cul-
ture to be combined with the traditional R&D and engineering 
background of the company, and the environment was a constant 
struggle between efficiency and creativity.38 The existing design 
function was engineering, dominated by the Design for Six Sigma 
(DFSS), in which the main goal of the new product development 
process was to introduce Six Sigma quality from the very begin-
ning. According to Mauro Porcini, head of global strategic design 
in the consumer and office unit at 3M, “[w]hen 3M hired me they 
didn’t know how to use me—they just knew that they wanted to 
have more of a presence and focus on design. At 3M designers 
existed, but they were often not involved until the end of solution 
development.”39 “My biggest roadblock,” he notes, “was the lab 
33 In late 1999, Sony sold 55 million 
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games and made more than 3,000  
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directors who were in charge of creating new products. ‘Here 
arrives this young guy from Italy, from the periphery of the 3M 
empire, and he’s telling us how to do innovation?’”40
 Coming from his experience in the Italian office, Porcini 
understood that introducing a new design approach was not the 
concern solely of the design department; instead, it should affect 
the whole company, thereby challenging its culture and its resis-
tance to change. As one of the technical directors reported, “At 
first we thought ‘What is this guy talking about?’ Mauro [asks] 
‘what does that mop on the shelf say to the customer when she 
shops?’ I’m thinking ‘It’s a mop; how much water comes out?’”41
 Porcini introduced design culture into 3M by involving 
the different labs and external consultants and stakeholders from 
the very beginning, performing a concurrent design process 
and aligning everyone in the new vision using a participatory 
approach. The incorporation of design culture, as described by 
Porcini, was based not on the top-down introduction of theoretical 
issues, methods, or techniques but on a bottom-up approach in 
which the process of developing new products could act as an 
agent for cultural change in the company. The design of new prod-
ucts was an occasion for aligning everyone with the new approach 
and vision. Porcini’s early failures in the introduction of a design-
driven view of innovation helped to show the correct path, and the 
commercial success of a few products designed or redesigned 
according to the new “designerly” approach served as a turning 
point in changing preconceived ideas about what product develop-
ment looks like.42
Discussion of Case Studies 
Although the idea of design thinking is based on the belief that 
anyone can be creative and contribute to the generation of ideas, its 
application in companies has mainly resulted in the commitment 
of top-level managers to using designers as consultants to apply 
design thinking processes and techniques to the creation of inno-
vative ideas that the companies should develop to innovate and 
exploit the market. The aim of these types of processes is to force 
outside-the-box thinking, and within this framework design 
thinking is primarily seen as a way to introduce or stimulate cre-
ativity for the envisioning of new solutions. 
 The three cases presented above show how organizational 
change is much more complex than simply leading people to think 
outside the boundaries of their daily context. The literature on 
organizational change identifies many other issues that strongly 
affect innovation in organizations, including cross-divisional 
work, cross-disciplinary work, resistance to change, overcoming 
dogmatic thinking, the need for new competences and technolo-
gies, and inefficiency of production and business processes.43
40 Chuck Salter, “The Nine Passions of 3M’s 
Mauro Porcini,” Fast Company 159; 
www.fastcompany.com/design/2011/ 




43 Hamel and Prahalad, Competing for  
the Future.
DesignIssues:  Volume 30, Number 1  Winter 201452
 While the role and the effectiveness of design thinking as a 
soft approach for directing organizational change toward innova-
tion must still be demonstrated, these three cases show how the 
design culture applied to the development of a new product (LEGO 
Mindstorm and Sony Playstation) and the introduction of design 
competences (3M) led to dynamic and emergent changes in the cul-
ture of the companies. In particular, they show the following:
	 •	 The	innovation	projects	described	can	be	considered	 
  examples of design culture in action.
	 •	Design	culture	in	action	can	be	seen	as	a	process	that		
  generates innovation mainly by prototyping, by using  
  a trial-and-error approach, and only subsequently by  
  adopting a convergent way of thinking, based on the  
  satisfaction of the product requirements.44
	 •	When	design	culture	addresses	innovation	in	an	 
  enterprise, it can affect the firm’s established structure  
  and culture, challenging the ways in which people  
  interact with one another, its existing capabilities, and  
  how daily activities are accomplished.
	 •	Organizational	changes	can	occur	as	unplanned	effects		
  of innovation development projects.
Design culture in action, as a process that can generate significant 
innovation through trial and error, accepts that constraints can be 
overcome by continuously discovering new micro-solutions and by 
embracing a process of continuous mediation among the actors 
and the competences involved, rather than adopting a predefined 
platform for development.
 The three cases show the larger role that design culture can 
play in a company, making clear that, more than leading processes 
of creativity, design culture makes clear the contradictions 
between the current culture of a company and the system of com-
petences, knowledge, and artifacts needed to innovate. The need 
to resolve these contradictions triggers the organizational and cul-
tural changes needed to develop the innovations.
 The “positive” role of contradictions in triggering change 
and facilitating innovation, and the development of new products 
as a continuous agent of generation of these contradictions was 
recognized in the literature. Takeuchi and his colleagues explicitly 
acknowledge that sparking innovation means continuously man-
aging tensions and contradictions, and making their creation and 
recognition part of the enterprise culture: 
 Quite simply, [Toyota Production System] is a ‘hard’  
 innovation that allows the company to keep improving  
 the way it manufactures vehicles; in addition, Toyota has  
 mastered a ‘soft’ innovation that relates to corporate  
 culture. The company succeeds, we believe, because it  
 creates contradictions and paradoxes in many aspects of  
44 Note that designers adopt a mix of  
divergent and convergent thinking and 
that both the capability to generate 
creative ideas by exploring solutions and 
the capability to follow logical steps to 
refine solutions are necessary in design 
activity. Both must be structured in a  
variable mix, depending on the purpose 
and phase of the project.
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 organizational life.… People often ask us, ‘Tell me one  
 thing I should learn from Toyota.’ That misses the point.  
 Emulating Toyota isn’t about copying any one practice;  
 it’s about creating a culture. That takes time. It requires  
 resources. And it isn’t easy.45 
Note that Takeuchi’s thinking evolved from the idea of the trans-
ferability of best practices to the idea that to develop continuous 
innovation, companies need to contextualize forms of knowledge 
creation and practices of management, new product development, 
and production.
 In the LEGO Mindstorm case, the failure to develop a new 
product became the unexpected occasion for radically changing 
the dogmas and values of the company. It was able to move from 
a model in which innovation is created by internal functions 
(e.g., R&D) and defended by a complex system of copyrights, to a 
model of open innovation strongly based on interaction with 
external communities of hackers, developers, and designers. The 
cultural change in this case was linked with the introduction of 
new competences, a new internal design center, new production 
processes, new distribution chains, and new products, all based 
on a new business model that exploited a partnership with exter-
nal communities.
 In the Playstation case, the adoption of a design-led 
approach in the development of the new product, and its success 
on the market, happened in a climate of distrust and resistance to 
change—one that threatened failure for the Playstation project 
long before it could gain momentum and become the biggest Sony 
success in the past 17 years. Relevant to Sony’s case is what Schein 
says about culture and resistance to change:
 [A]s companies age, elements of the corporate culture or  
 the misalignment of subcultures can become serious  
 survival problems for the organization, especially if the  
 technology, market conditions, and financial situation  
 have changed. Key elements of the corporate culture can  
 become a serious constraint on learning and change. The  
 organization clings to whatever made it a success. The  
 very culture that created the success makes it difficult for  
 members of the organization to perceive changes in the  
 environment that require new responses. Culture becomes  
 a constraint on strategy.46
The 3M case supports our ideas that cultural change in an enter-
prise might result from the introduction of bottom-up design pro-
cesses, and that the change can be emergent, as the literature has 
already recognized, rather than planned and based on the top-
down introduction of new methods and processes.47 The case also 
shows that when design culture is inserted into companies that 
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already exhibit a strong culture, as at 3M, this introduction neces-
sarily generates inter-functional and cultural conflicts that can 
best be solved by designers who are capable of mediating and 
negotiating the processes of inclusion and participation. The way 
in which 3M decided to invest in design, although still character-
ized by a certain naiveté, shows that companies and sectors that 
are traditionally far from design can start to understand design’s 
strategic role and how its introduction is a matter of culture, which 
takes time to develop. 
 Porcini’s recent shift to PepsiCo in the newly created role  
 of chief design officer was officially introduced as a matter  
 of creating a design culture in a company that does not   
 have it. The shift confirms a general trend, as well as our  
 suggestion, that companies have started looking at design  
 as a a particular internal culture with a pervasive presence,  
 rather than as a set of services that can be externalized and  
 applied only in particular situations. As Brad Jakeman,   
 president of PepsiCo’s global beverage group, declared in  
 an interview with Ad Age: We firmly believe design and  
 design thinking is a significant vector of innovation and  
 therefore growth. I was looking for somebody who could  
 not only orchestrate amazing design but also… build a   
 design culture within an organization. Mauro, through all  
 of his accomplishments doing that at 3M, rose to the top as  
 the perfect candidate.48
In the case of 3M, we documented a structural intervention—
something that might interfere by its very nature with the culture 
of the company—but in all three cases we also showed that the 
development of new products might open unexpected possibilities 
of change for the culture of the enterprise. In particular, the new 
product development processes studied did the following: 
	 •	 forced	the	employees	to	overcome	their	limits	 
  and dogmas;
	 •	 aligned	the	employees	with	the	potential	of	a	 
  new vision;
	 •	 encouraged	the	companies	to	transform	the	processes	 
  of production, distribution, and communication; and
	 •	 helped	the	companies	to	revise	their	strategies	and	 
  to develop their own design culture.
The three reported cases clearly show that design culture 
approaches innovation in a way that differs from the traditional 
managerial approach. In particular, we emphasize the following 
distinctive aspects:
 1. Generation of fresh insights. Watching for and identifying  
  emerging needs in a very direct but naive way—without  
  the filters and dogmas bound to established procedures  
48 Natalie Zmuda, “Pepsico Creates Chief 
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  and ways of doing—is a key element of the design   
  approach to innovation. The innovation is sought as  
  an intuitive recognition of and response to a need,   
  thereby forcing the company to change along the   
  way. The whole Playstation development process was  
  generated and driven by Kutaragi’s search for a better  
  gaming experience.
 2. Perception of failure as a working tool. The managerial   
  approach to innovation often lives by the mantra,  
  “failure is not an option.” A design culture, meanwhile,  
  sees that learning through prototyping, accepting  
  modifications—even radical ones, and assuming failure  
  as part of the process can free designers from the fear  
  of organizational punishment. This fear limits managers  
  in the way they deal with change and innovation because 
  they believe that the best way to avoid such punishment  
  is by trying to please all functions and key roles inside  
  the company and adopting conservative solutions that  
  maintain the status quo. The cases of both LEGO and  
  Sony depict the conception of failure in design culture  
  as part of the game of innovation and not as something  
  that must be avoided at all costs. In many cases, it is  
  documented how early failures lead to success. The  
  April 2011 issue of the Harvard Business Review is, in  
  fact, entirely dedicated to failure.
 3. Integrated vision over functional vision. For innovation  
  projects, design culture adopts a systematic, holistic  
  approach that defines the entire platform of stakeholders  
  needed for the project. The managerial approach, mean- 
  while, often is structured to achieve efficiency through a  
  functional subdivision of the tasks. To increase efficiency  
  and to avoid failure, managers tend to rely on pre-exist- 
  ing knowledge and resources and on separate functions  
  in the process of developing new products, thus dramati- 
  cally reducing the chances of creating breakthroughs or  
  facing unexpected changes during the process.
Conclusion
In recent years, design thinking has received much attention as 
a driver for change and innovation in enterprises. This attention 
resulted in the adoption of a set of techniques and tools in the field 
of idea generation that managers are supposed to learn and easily 
replicate in different contexts because thinking in a designerly way 
could be the key to creating and fostering innovation. Such tools 
and techniques reflect a serious misunderstanding: Design does 
not contribute to innovation simply by generating new ideas; 
it does so by actually constructing new, viable solutions. This con-
struction can occur only in environments characterized by a real 
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design culture, as we defined it, through new product develop-
ment processes that are likely to introduce or require concurrent 
organizational changes. Thus, the real innovation booster that 
could radically change companies, competencies and processes, 
and even transform people in organizations lies in managing inno-
vation projects using a situated design culture.
 Disconnecting design thinking from “design doing” is the 
wrong way to express the potential of design with respect to the 
management of innovation and organizations. The results of the 
most advanced studies on organizational culture and on practice-
oriented culture demonstrated the need to avoid separating the 
tacit from the explicit dimension of knowledge.49 
 The three cases discussed demonstrate that more than 
design thinking per se, new product development, and new inter-
nal processes produced the occasion for the change. Projects of 
significant innovation drove the three companies to cope with 
the unexpected need for change based on the implicit action of 
design culture. 
 In this framework, the idea of design culture is far from 
being a shortcut to the introduction of design in companies; it is 
based on the necessity of rooting design deeply within the enter-
prise, which takes both a long time and the ability to adapt it to the 
specificity of the situation. We believe that innovation can be fully 
developed and exploited only “inside the box”—in a situated 
way—by considering the organizational context (company), the 
technological and productive context (technology and production), 
and the context of use (society and market).
 We see great opportunities for the expansion of knowledge 
about how design practice and organizational change can be car-
ried out simultaneously. Intriguing opportunities are arising 
to discuss from a new perspective the relationship between 
design culture—as one of the relevant domains of competence and 
knowledge that addresses innovation—and the phenomenon of 
organizational change.
 Organizational change emerged in unexpected ways in 
the cases described, but if we assume that significant innovations 
necessarily bring with them organizational changes, we could 
anticipate the need for change, accepting and expecting it as a nat-
ural consequence of the development of new products. As a prom-
ising object of future studies, to what degree can the actions of 
organizational change be planned and intentionally carried out 
simultaneously with the development of new products? Great 
potential arises for the cooperation of design research and mana-
gerial research in the development of a common framework of 
action, with which firms could carry out a change in their offer-
ings (product and service innovations) as they carry out a change 
in the ways they develop, produce, and deliver them to the market 
(organizational change).
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